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Abstrak 
 
Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan kebijakan keamanan perbatasan Turki dalam 
menghadapi aktor non-negara di Suriah Utara. Kebijakan Turki tersebut dilakukan 
setelah lima tahun keterlibatannya dalam krisis Suriah dan satu bulan setelah upaya 
kudeta yang gagal. Penelitian ini menggunakan teori sekuritisasi oleh Buzan yang 
menjelaskan tentang adanya faktor ancaman dan kerawanan yang dihadapi negara 
dalam struktur internasional yang anarki. Metode penelitian yang digunakan dalam 
penelitian ini adalah metode kualitatif dengan jenis analisis kausalitas. Tulisan ini 
menemukan bahwa ancaman dan kerawanan mendorong Turki melancarkan 
serangkaian operasi militer sebagai kebijakan keamanan perbatasan untuk 
membersihkan Suriah Utara dari milisi-milisi ISIS dan PKK/PYD/YPG untuk mengontrol 
dampak buruk yang disebabkan oleh keberadaan aktor non-negara seperti korban sipil 
dan militer, kerusakan properti, serta instabilitas dan disintegrasi. Kebijakan keamanan 
perbatasan tersebut mengkonfirmasi tentang semakin pentingnya peran Turki di kawasan 
sekaligus menunjukkan konsistensi Turki dalam mengejar kepentingan keamanan 
nasional walaupun di luar wilayahnya. 
Kata Kunci: aktor non-negara, ancaman dan kerentanan, kebijakan keamanan 
perbatasan, Suriah Utara, Turki 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper aims to explain Turkey's border security policy in dealing with non-state actors 
in Northern Syria. Turkey's policy was carried out after five years of involvement in the 
Syrian crisis and one month after a failed coup attempt. This study uses the theory of 
securitization by Buzan that explains the existence of threat and vulnerability factors 
faced by the state in anarchic international structures. The research method used in this 
study is a qualitative method with the type of causality analysis. This paper found that 
threats and vulnerabilities pushed Turkey to launch a series of military operations as 
border security policies to rid North Syria of ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG militias to control 
the adverse effects caused by the presence of non-state actors such as civilian and military 
casualties, property damage, as well as instability and disintegration. The border security 
policy confirms the increasingly important role of Turkey in the region while 
demonstrating Turkey's consistency in pursuing national security interests even outside 
its territory. 
Keywords: border security policy, non-state actors, Northern Syria, threats and 
vulnerability, Turkey  
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Introduction  
 
Turkey has been a security actor not only in the region where it geographically lies but 
also in other regions like Europe, Asia, and Africa. The state’s increasing capability is 
equipped with resources and desire to use military power beyond its borders (Lesser, 
2000: 183). It can draw many researchers’ attention due to its economic and military 
growth and implications to its active foreign policy. Besides, it survives despite hostile 
environments and relatively succeeds to engage in cooperation with many states in the 
regions.  
Turkey had been firmly involving in the Syrian crisis since the very beginning. 
Sharing the border with Syria, the state seriously considered domino effects of the conflict 
towards its domestic stability. Its early involvement was to persuade the Syrian regime to 
provide domestic political change and form a transitional government as demanded by 
the people. Realizing that good relationship with Syria did not contribute to the 
achievement of its foreign policy goals, it took the conflicting stand against the regime 
by supporting the opposition groups under the umbrella organization called the Free Syria 
Army (FSA). 
States were not the only actors in the Syrian conflict but the armed groups taking 
side with either the Assad’s ruling regime or the opposition groups. Such a situation 
facilitated the conflict to persist and harm Turkey’s security as it penetrated through the 
border. Among the armed groups that Turkey considered threats towards its security 
especially near the border were the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and 
PKK/PYD/YPG1. Both are labeled terror groups and terrorist organizations by the 
Turkish government. 
The ISIS declared the caliphate overseeing some areas in Iraq and Syria’s territory 
in line with its territorial gain from rival groups. Not only did its militias threaten all 
enemies in the claimed territory but also they forwarded threats into the Turkish soils. In 
the border of Turkey-Syria particularly, the armed group provoked instability and fear 
among people. Furthermore, its militias were able to cross the border and carry out 
 
1 The Kurdish Worker Party (PKK). The Democratic Union Party (PYD). The People Protection Unit 
(YPG) is a PYD’s military wing. The Turkish government perceived the groups as one organization in 
spite of their various names. 
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bombings targeting the Turkish citizens, including foreign nationals and public properties 
(Yeşiltaş, Öncel & Öztürk, 2016: 9). 
The PKK/PYD/YPG had become the most powerful armed group in northern 
Syria since the Syrian regime’s armed forces left the area. Turkey called the PYD/YPG a 
Syria’s offshoot of the PKK repeatedly trying to destabilize its sovereignty in line with 
their demand for either independence or autonomy. Not only did the Kurdish armed group 
conquer the areas in the borderline and dominate military and political influence alike 
amongst the Kurdish groups in the region, but it also challenged Turkey’s border security. 
Turkey’s threat perception was growing following the US’ support from over the 
PKK/PYD/YPG’s role in fighting the ISIS to inception of the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF) whose members were dominated by the PKK/PYD/YPG’s militias (Stein, 2017: 
2-4). The US assisted the SDF’s formation and operation to reduce the world’s perception 
of the US’ support to the PKK and claimed such new armed organization had no other 
purpose but to fight the ISIS (Kabalan, 2019). The Turkish government, however, 
perceived the US’ strategy would harm the state’s security interest. Consequently, the 
US’ role behind the PKK/PYD/YPG affected its more aggressive security policy in the 
border. 
Realizing the threats coming from ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG especially in the 
border, Turkey sought to maintain the areas stable and secure of their presence and terror 
activities. Moreover, both showed their resistance to Turkey’s foreign policy in Syria. 
The state was encouraged to issue its border security policy in 2016 as it claimed the right 
of self-defense after a five-year involvement in the Syrian conflict. 
There exists some literature revealing the Turkish foreign policy towards Syria, 
security policy against armed groups, and relevant issues giving a contribution to the 
current research. Hameed and Mustofa (2018) found that Turkey re-orientated its foreign 
policy towards Syria mainly due to change in the Turkish ruling elites. Besides, the study 
revealed that the state could not engage in Syria away from the calculations of both 
regional and international powers. D’Alema (2017) argued that Turkey’s foreign policy 
under the AKP towards Syria evolved. The first phase began with a harmonious 
relationship under the ‘zero-problem with neighbors’ policy, the second phase was 
indicated by the state’s demand for the Syrian regime change and the last was pragmatic 
policy due to existing predicaments. 
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Okyay (2017) found that the dynamics in Syria encouraged Turkey to influence 
the post-conflict power reconfiguration as well as safeguard its territorial integrity and 
centralized nation-state structure against Kurdish nationalist mobilization leading to 
changing border management modalities. The study also revealed that the major 
implication for domestic politics was a hardening of sectarian, ethnic, boundaries not only 
for the Turkish Alevi Kurds but also for the opposing political parties. 
Zahra (2017) found that Turkey’s policies towards Syria were critical within the 
Middle East region in which the conflicts and wars against the ISIS and PKK weakened 
its bilateral relations. The study suggested that the Syrian refugees and the PKK pose 
challenges to the state’s economy and domestic security. Eren (2013) argued that the PKK 
shifted its financing activities to the border area since Turkey could not control its 
extensive and geographically tough land border. Besides, such uncontrolled areas 
facilitated the PKK to conquer and simplify smuggling. Karakoç and Doğruel (2015) 
suggested that problematic relations between Turkey and Syria following the uprising 
cause an impact on human security in the border area. The study argued that the state’s 
policy towards Syria shaped the perception of insecurity among Syrian refugees and the 
people of Hatay, a southeastern regional province sharing the border with Syria.  
While the literature reviewed proves Turkey’s active foreign policy towards Syria 
especially after the Arab Spring, so does the literature show that the state’s perception of 
the existing conflict in Syria brought challenges to its main domestic security interest. In 
spite of its contribution in confirming the security issue, the literature leaves the questions 
regarding the state’s border security policy forms against non-state actors like not only 
the PKK/PYD/YPG but also the ISIS as well as the driving factors. The study is intended 
to narrow the gap which gives a better understanding of Turkey’s border security policy 
in the securitization theory taking into account the role of given international structure 
and the Turkish leaders’ language capability. 
This paper provides the answer to the research-conducted question “Why did 
Turkey carry out a security policy against such non-state actors as the ISIS and 
PKK/PYD/YPG in the border sharing with Syria. To be precise, the paper aims to explain 
the driving factors of such a border security policy in the securitization theory and 
describe the policy forms. The study was limited to the impact of Syria’s conflict with 
Turkey’s border security and the phenomenon studied was between 2016 and 2019. The 
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state began to issue the policy exactly in 2016 and lasted a few years when the research 
was being conducted. 
The issue belongs to security studies emphasizing the states’ struggle in 
maintaining its security against possible threats. The paper is advantageous for the 
international relations scholarship since it presents another perspective on Turkey’s 
response towards the excess of the Syrian conflict and helps understand the dynamics of 
regional politics comprehensively by melding the neorealist and constructivist approach. 
The paper comprises an introduction, theoretical framework, methods, results and 
discussion, and conclusion. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Securitization Theory 
The research applied the securitization theory proposed by Buzan. Buzan’s securitization 
theory is one of the theories belonging to the Copenhagen school providing an innovative, 
sophisticated and productive research strategy within contemporary security studies as 
well as criticisms (Williams, 2003: 511). However, the securitization theory can explain 
how threats have a strong correlation to the dynamics of a state’s security. Stone (2009: 
3) argues that Buzan’s theory is the combination of neo-realist and constructivist 
approaches in which he primes his belief in an international structure called anarchy and 
addresses the social aspects of security and how people or societies construct or securitize 
threats. 
In security studies, the bottom line of security relates to states’ survival. Though 
states are still the main units in international politics due to their powers and military 
capabilities as well as a source of threats and the main referent objects of threats, the units 
of non-states also matter. For instance, there have been non-state actors engaging in a 
military game against states. For this Buzan (1983: 37) states: 
 “Not only is the state by far the most powerful type of unit in terms of political 
allegiance and authority, but also it is normally dominant everywhere in terms of 
its command over instruments of force, particularly the major military machines 
required for modern warfare. Most of the non-state units that also command 
political and military power see themselves as aspirant states or state-makers such 
as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, the Irish Republican Army, Kurdish 
nationalist organisations, and many others.” 
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Buzan also defines security as a pursuit of freedom from threats (Šulovic, 2010: 
1). In terms of security discourse, Buzan differentiates the security of individuals from 
that of the state known as a security problem. While the aspect of individual security 
relates to social threats because people are embedded in a human environment with 
inevitable social, economic and political consequences, the state security relates to the 
performance of maintaining internal social order and external defense (Buzan, 1983: 19-
21). In order to perform both functions, a state’s action could unavoidably cost individual 
security meaning that the state can be either a source of security for or threat against 
individual interest. Therefore, the pursuit of an individual security is both stimulus and 
constraint on national security (Buzan, 1983: 34). 
Regarding the relationship between a state’s behavior and the international 
system, the theory proposes a proposition that a state would perceive self-insecurity 
(national insecurity) due to the melding of threats and vulnerabilities which then leads it 
to consider a securitization policy as Buzan (1983: 73) argues: “Only when we have 
established a reasonable idea of both the nature of threats and the vulnerabilities of the 
objects towards which they are directed, can we begin to make sense of national security 
as a policy problem. Insecurity reflects a combination of threats and vulnerabilities and 
the two cannot meaningfully be separated.” 
Most threats involve many complicated factors and cause uncertainties that states 
have to allocate the threats to their national security and anticipate the effects brought by 
both threats and vulnerabilities. Like other Copenhagen school theorists, Buzan’s 
securitization theory embraces five sectors of threats, namely political, military, 
economic, societal and environmental sector (Buzan, 1983: 75-83; Buzan, Waever & de 
Wilde, 1998: 22-23). Despite that those sectors have distinctive referent objects, security 
units, and survival characteristics, among which to traditionalists the military is the states 
mostly a concern, they are less independent or inter-connected for national security.  
In addition to breaking down threats by sectors, Buzan (1983: 83-88) introduces 
other threat variables such as source, intensity, and historical change. In terms of source, 
threats can come from internal (like secessionist activities) and external of the state (other 
states and non-state actors). Intensity variable is determined by several factors for 
instances, geography or spatial sense (if the threats are close at hand, middle-distanced or 
faraway), temporal sense (if the threats are immediate or take some time to develop), 
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probability (if the threats have a chance) and measure of seriousness (if the threats are 
seriously carried out). The last, historical change means that if the states are able to adapt 
to the development of technology, military, economy, and others as so do threats evolve. 
Meanwhile, vulnerabilities can vary such as limited population, poor resources, 
indefensible boundaries, and others in term of the weak state or weak power’s comparison 
to the global power (Buzan, 1983: 73-74). In order to respond to the insecurity and 
provide national security, the state has two strategies; concentrating on cutting off threats 
at the source outward called the international security strategy and reducing its 
vulnerabilities inward called the national security strategy where leaders are responsible 
for combining these strategies with the logical, perceptual and political element to come 
up with a security policy (Stone, 2009: 7).  
In Buzan’s theory, security policy-making is part of a national security problem 
made up of those three problems. Within logical problems, leaders consider objectives 
(ends) and techniques, resources, instruments and actions (means) where ends justify 
means and due to the fact that absolute security is never going to be attained, the sacrifices 
of state and its citizens would be necessary to make attain it (Buzan, 1983: 215; Stone, 
2009: 8). On the other hand, perceptual problems rest on the fundamental information 
during the policymaking (Buzan, 1983: 215) and political problems rest on the political 
process in which domestic actors’ views addressing international structure are contested 
(Buzan, 1983: 231). 
Leaning on Waever’s speech act model (theory) to arrive at the policy, the theory 
suggests that the units (securitization actors) construct a threat to any referent object’s 
existence or securitize an issue as an urgent matter requiring an immediate measure to 
which audience resonates (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998: 5). As the Copenhagen 
School has developed, securitization is merely politicizing an issue and only if the issue 
can leave the normal politics to emergency politics sphere is it called a successful 
securitizing move. During this process, Waever (2011: 466) argues that the role of 
expression is important.  
In the research, Turkey was facing insecurity due to threats and vulnerabilities. 
The threats which Turkey perceived stemmed from the ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG as well 
as uncertainty in Syria. The armed groups destabilized the state, especially its border areas 
through some terror activities. ISIS took advantage of long Turkey-Syria borderline to 
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head inward and outward and targeted the Turkish civilians and armies. The armed 
group’s success in gaining more lands incited instability around the border; meanwhile, 
its southeastern region was still under the PKK’s threat.  
The PKK/PYD/YPG also advanced its territorial gains in the border in addition to 
warning Turkey through several terror activities not only in the areas near the border but 
also in further areas within the state. The state believed that the armed group ruled most 
of northern Syria inhabited by Kurdish people would harm Syria’s integrity which also 
meant to harm its integrity. Both ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG’s presence along with external 
powers intervention and support had complicated the conflict and caused a great number 
of refugees to cross its border. 
The PKK’s demand for either independence or autonomy, domestic instability 
potential, and geographical position in the middle of heated conflicts within the 
international system could be vulnerabilities for Turkey. The state was struggling to 
create stability from the PKK/PYD/YPG’s military and political influence from within 
and since the Syrian crisis started, it had been deploying more resources to dam the 
conflict from entering its territory as well.  
The border security was highly important to Turkey as the region was mostly 
inhabited by the Kurdish people. The insecurity of border areas would be harmful to the 
state’s sovereignty now that it could fuel the demand for its southeastern region’s 
independence and raise the PKK/PYD/YPG’s power growth. To the state, maintaining 
sovereignty was considered a condition to maintain its power and vice versa. In response 
to the threats, as argued in the securitization theory, the state took an exceptional measure 
or the use of force as its border security policy since the issue became urgent to solve 
through repeatedly expressed rhetoric of its elites.  
The Turkish President (and Prime Minister before the state transformed into a 
presidential system in 2017) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was considered the 
important actors securitizing the border issue as an emergency. Meanwhile, the 
securitized issue resonated well with the Turkish parliament and the public. 
Consequently, the state’s concern about border security was admitted and supported by 
the parliament, and the executive body was given the mandate to deal with the threats in 
any measure. The policy was designed to clear the border areas from the ISIS and prevent 
Intermestic: Journal of International Studies 
Volume 4, No. 2, Mei 2020 (179-200) doi:10.24198/intermestic.v4n2.5  
 
www.intermesticjournal.fisip.unpad.ac.id. | 187  
e-ISSN.2503-443X 
 
the PKK/PYD/YPG from expanding its territorial gains. The state raised military 
operations and targeted the armed groups in both its territory and Syria’s territory.  
The securitization policy in the form of military operations was also encouraged by 
the anarchic structure of international politics with which Turkish leaders considered that 
the state’s security determined its security, without counting on other powers, against the 
existing threats. The security policy was aimed to protect its civilians, military personnel, 
and properties, create border stability, and defense national integrity. Furthermore, to 
reach such a security policy, the leaders needed to assure other units within the state 
through the language (speech act) to support their concern to turn an urgent issue for the 
state to handle. Here the neorealist and constructivist perspective mutually complement 
the analysis of the study.   
 
Methods 
The research applied the qualitative method with causal analysis. It was library research 
whose data ranged from variously recorded sources such as books, book chapters, journal 
articles, research reports or papers, working papers, policy briefs, videos, and other useful 
documents. The study applied the analytic induction model developed by Znaniecki to 
analyze data. Bryman defines the analytic induction as an approach to analyze data which 
within the process the researcher looks up a universal explanation on the social 
phenomenon studied beginning from collecting data until finding out deviant cases off 
the hypothesis (Bakry, 2017: 192). 
The analysis model suggests several steps; (1) designing rough definition of the 
research question; (2) determining hypothetical explanation of the research question; (3) 
collecting data and examining the cases; (4) Should deviant cases not be found, the 
hypothesis is confirmed, and (5) should any deviant case be found, the analyst has to 
either reformulate the hypothesis and collect data further to examine the case or redefine 
the hypothetical explanation to exclude such deviant case (Bryman, as cited in Bakry, 
2017: 193).  
After collecting some relevant pieces of information on the case, the research 
question was designed, “Why did Turkey raise a border security policy against non-state 
actors regarding the Syrian conflict?” Thanks to the data collected, the hypothesis was 
created. Afterward, it was traced and examined through more data. During the research, 
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the hypothesis was reformulated and redefined until it was convincingly confirmed. The 
research confirmed that Turkey committed a serious of military operations as its national 
border security policy was driven by threats and vulnerabilities. The cross-border 
operations were purposively issued to remove the ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG, therefore, it 
would be able to protect its citizens and properties, create border stability, and maintain 
territorial integrity.     
 
Turkey’s Insecurity: Threats and Vulnerabilities 
Before the paper explains Turkey’s insecurity factor, it is necessary to understand the 
geopolitics in northern Syria. The region was predominantly inhabited by Syrian Kurdish 
people sharing the borderline with Turkey’s southeastern region which was also 
predominantly inhabited by the Kurdish people (Turkish Kurds). Like the rest of Syria, 
the region was a persistent battleground among the armed groups. At the beginning of the 
Syrian uprising, the Assad’s regime granted autonomous status to the Kurdish region to 
prevent the Kurdish groups from joining the opposition forces against the regime and 
defend the region with its governance. However, the situation in the region turned 
complicated due to the emerging of new armed groups as new players, the Kurdish 
groups’ independent maneuvers from the Syrian regime, and the US’ strategic interest in 
the region. The main conflicting actors in the region can be seen in Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1 – The Conflicting Actors in Northern Syria 
 
No State and Non-state Actors Aligned with Objectives 
1 Syria’s Armed Forces (Assad) Russia, Iran Defend Syria’s national integrity and the 
Assad’s regime. 
 
2 ISIS - Establish a caliphate within Syria and 
Iraq. 
 
3 PKK*/YPG/PYD** The US Maintain northern Syria’s autonomy and 
governance. 
*Demand an independent state or an 
autonomous region of Turkey’s 
southeastern region. 
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**When backed by the US, it maneuvered 
far more independently from the Assad’s 
regime. 
 
4 FSA Turkey Defend Syria’s national integrity and 
demand regime change in Syria. 
Source: Collected and Extracted from Various Sources by Authors 
  
 Next to the Assad’s regime armed forces mainly backed by Russia and Iran, there 
were several important armed groups (non-state actors) in the region whose roles were 
significant in the conflict as they affected tensions and complicated regional powers’ 
foreign policy (see table 1). The ISIS aggressively conquered many areas in the region to 
realize its caliphate policy and fought against all of the armed groups. ISIS’s rise 
operating not only in Syria but also in the neighborhood could be a common threat to the 
Syrian regime, the Kurdish armed groups, opposition forces, and foreign powers. The 
PYD/YPG was the most dominant and influential among the Kurdish groups in the 
region. Turkey saw it as the same organization as the PKK which was orchestrating 
instability for many years within its territory. Despite its linkage to the PKK, the US 
provided support to such an armed group and established SDF to fight the ISIS. When 
backed by the US, it tended to maneuver much more independently from Syria’s regime 
and even demanded the region free from the regime’s interference.   
As the theory suggests, Turkey perceived the insecurity caused by threats and 
vulnerabilities which can be drawn in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2 – Turkey’s Threats and Vulnerabilities 
 
Threats  Objects Threatened 
ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG  
(sources of threats) 
- Close at hand 
- Immediate 
- Probable 
- Serious 
- Foreign powers’ 
intervention/support 
Civilians, military personnel and properties 
- Threats targeted the Turkish civilians, military 
personnel and facilities 
Border Stability 
- Threats destabilized borders and Turkey’s 
territory 
- Threats caused a massive influx of refugees into 
Turkey 
Territorial Integrity 
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- Threats conquered and governed most of 
northern Syria causing Syria’s disintegration 
- Syria’s disintegration threatened Turkey’s 
integrity 
Vulnerabilities  
- Domestic problem 
- Geographical proximity 
- Turkey’s relative power to 
global powers in international 
anarchical structure 
 
 
Source: Collected and Extracted from Various Sources by Authors 
 
The FSA was the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF)’s strategically on the battleground 
against the ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG. Demanding the regime change in Syria and 
maintaining Syria’s integrity against the previous two armed groups’ ambition alike were 
its main purposes. The Turkey-backed opposition forces finally incorporated into another 
umbrella group called the Syrian National Army (SNA), together with other northern 
Syrian groups after capturing some areas from the ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG’s militias. 
The Dynamics in northern Syria impacted Turkey’s security interest not only to 
citizens but also to stability and integrity since its involvement in the conflict and among 
the non-state actors, the ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG’s existence was the Turkish 
government concerned a lot as sources of threats. Just like ISIS, the PKK/PYD/YPG 
which controlled 65 percent of northern Syria had been committing several attacks 
causing casualties among Turkish civilians, military personnel, and properties. The 
statistics of the terror attacks blamed on both armed groups between January 2015 and 
January 2017 reached up to 28 cases, occurring in various places in Turkey (Luerdi & 
Alfajri, 2017: 20-23).  
The ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG’s activities threatened Turkish border stability. 
Their confrontations against each other and other rebel factions especially the FSA caused 
instability along the border. Not only did they target the FSA’s strongholds within Syria 
but they also launched several attacks to the Turkish towns near the border. In addition to 
such suffering, the state was a home for most Syrian refugees escaping the conflict which 
in return became its domestic burden. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (2019) recorded that there had been 3,691,333 Syrian refugees living in the state 
since the Syrian conflict started. The Syrian refugees especially originating northern Syria 
would multiply in numbers providing that it did not control the region. 
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While the ISIS strove to create its caliphate taking some of Syria’s areas, the 
PKK/PYD/YPG’s ruled significant areas in northern Syria and created its governance. 
Both armed groups’ aggressiveness in governing the areas was a threat to Syria’s integrity 
and complicated the FSA’s strategy to defend Syria’s national integrity. The 
PKK/PYD/YPG’s effort to maintain northern Syria’s autonomy was potential to Syria’s 
territorial disintegration and Turkey believed the group had a long term agenda, 
establishing an independent Kurdish state which also targeted its Southeastern region. 
Leaving the armed group with its governance in northern Syria would cost the state’s 
future national integrity. 
The threats were followed by Turkey’s vulnerabilities such as domestic problems, 
geographical proximity, and power comparison within the international system. The state 
was still facing the PKK rebel group in its southeastern region. While the armed group 
was still fighting the Turkish government and threatening its integrity at home, its 
involvement played important roles in defending the PYD/PYG’s position in northern 
Syria. Turkey’s southeastern region shared borders directly with northern Syria which 
enabled threats to travel swiftly into its territory. The state realized its power compared 
to other global powers intervening in the conflict like the US and Russia. Thanks to their 
involvement, the conflict constellation remained dynamic while the armed groups could 
gain more power and put their security interest at stake. 
 Based on the constructivist principle as the theory embraces that reality is 
constructed, Turkey’s insecurity and threats were constructed by the leaders 
(securitization units) during the policymaking process. The research emphasized the role 
of the Turkish president (and also Prime Minister) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 
the policymaking, they were responsible for constructing threats which targeted the 
referent objects (see Table 2) and insecurity by considering whole fundamental 
information such as the threats were close at hand, immediate, probable and serious in 
addition to attracting foreign powers’ intervention or support (see Table 2). So did they 
have to consider the policy’s objectives to the resources the state had? In term of the 
policy, they would prefer to have military operations by exploiting own resources in order 
to remove the threats swiftly. 
The leaders had to engage in the political process within which their ideas could be 
contested with other Turkish domestic actors’ stance. The latter also called an audience, 
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referred to the Turkish parliament and publics which had an important role in supporting 
the policy. While the parliament passed motions to Turkish authorities to carry out several 
cross-border operations (Xinhua, 2019), the positive image on the operations among the 
Turkish publics rose following media coverage (Aljazeera, 2019). To the audience, the 
leaders overstated the ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG as serious threats threatening the referent 
objects and securitized border as an emergency to the state. Their language capabilities 
contributed to allowing a military option as the state’s border security policy. It aligned 
with what the Turkish President Erdogan (2016) stated at the conference speech on the 
day of the first military operation launch: “The attacks that targeted our country from 
Syria have come to such a level that leaves us no choice but to solve this problem 
immediately and the process for this started today.” 
The state’s efforts to maintain its security regarding what was happening in Syria 
could also be heard from other officials’ repeated statements for instance, the Turkish 
Foreign Minister Cavusoglu (2019) stated on side of his overseas visit: 
 “Our only target is terrorists, in this way we will contribute to Syria's territorial 
integrity. Unfortunately, there is a terrorist organization in northeastern Syria. 
This is a grave threat to our country. The US gave them weapons and we arrest 
them in Turkey because the terrorist organizations in both northern Syria and 
Turkey are the same. This will be an important operation for the stability and 
security of the region.” 
 
 Using the securitization theory as a tool analysis, Turkey’s insecurity was raised 
by threats perception following its vulnerabilities. However, such threats and insecurity 
were constructed by the leaders during policymaking. In other words, they politicized that 
the Turkish citizens and properties, border stability, and integrity were the objects harmed 
by the threats. In responding to such threats and supported by parliament and public 
opinion, several military operations were deemed necessary and urgent. Only by the 
military incursions could the state clear the border of the threats and pursue its security 
interests. 
 
Turkey’s Border Security Policy: Military Operations 
To respond to the threats especially towards its border, Turkey committed military 
operations as its national border security policy. As mentioned, the operations’ main 
objective was to remove the ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG and stem their influence and 
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movements in northern Syria. The state already launched three cross-border military 
operations namely Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, and Operation 
Peace Spring. The areas covered by the three distinctive operations can be seen in Figure 
1 below: 
 
Figure 1 – Turkey’s Three Operations’ Areas 
   
 
Source: https://www.trtworld.com/turkey/operation-peace-spring-in-a-nutshell-30779 
  
Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) 
OES commenced from August 2016 to March 2017 to clear the ISIS and PKK/PYD/YPG 
in western Euphrates areas. Aktürk (2017: 94) suggested that OES indicate Turkey’s 
strength despite a one-month-after failed coup experience and dismissal of 43 percent of 
generals and admirals in its armed forces. OES mainly targeted to remove the ISIS from 
the border and prevent the PKK/PYD/YPG from forming the corridor stretching over the 
west of Euphrates River to the town of Afrin (Yeşiltaş, Seren & Özçelik, 2017: 12). 
Turkey launched OES following the agreement with Russia and the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from the areas. The state found a middle ground with Russia on Syria’s 
territorial integrity and it, therefore, focused on the two terror groups instead of arm 
confrontations with Syrian regime forces during the incursion.  
The presence of both terror groups within the areas risked Turkey’s national 
security which paved the TFA deployment. The ISIS-controlled a 100-kilometer 
borderline in the region of Azaz-Jarablus and from which its militias committed suicide 
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attacks in Turkish large cities (Yeşiltaş, Seren & Özçelik, 2017: 13). In addition to 
conquering a vast region and confronting the TAF and FSA’s members, the armed group 
was deemed to recruit new militias in Turkey to strengthen its strongholds and create 
instability in the state. 
While Turkey was facing ISIS’ threats at the domestic level, the PKK/PYD/YPG 
benefitted from the international anti-ISIS coalition by securing support from the US. The 
Kurdish armed group significantly took over the area previously dominated by ISIS and 
it, therefore, sought to reinforce its political and military power to remain the most 
important and strongest actor as well as extend its territorial domination from the west of 
Euphrates River to Afrin. Nevertheless, the attempts cost Turkey’s security since the 
Kurdish group was perceived as both a separatist and a terror organization threatening 
Turkish integrity and stability. In addition to the attempts, the group mobilized its militias 
to conduct several deadly attacks in Turkish soils. 
Having seen its border security harmed by the terror groups’ threats and its 
proximity to northern Syria, Turkey needed to take a cross-border military intervention 
against them into Syrian territory despite criticisms from the EU and the US. To the 
leaders, security was the most important interest which Turkey had to achieve. The state 
reiterated its importance and another possible similar move in the future as the Prime 
Minister Yıldırım (2017) stated during an interview program:  “After this point, if 
we take action in the event that our security is threatened or if action is needed against 
the ISIS and PKK, then it will be as part of a new operation. That means the Euphrates 
Shield is over and any potential actions, if necessary, will be named differently.” 
 As the Turkish National Security Council announced the end of OES, the TFA 
successfully liberated several important towns which were previously the terror groups’ 
basis such as Jarablus, Azaz, Al-Rai, and Al-Bab in which the FSA’s members could 
settle afterward. It was reported that more than 140,000 Syrian refugees were able to 
return home in the region after Turkey ended OES (Anadolu Agency, 2018). Besides 
neutralizing the terror groups’ components in the areas, the TFA and FSA pushed the 
militias 40 kilometers southward and created a 90-kilometer-in-length-and-40-kilometer-
in-dept safe zone between the border of Turkey-Syria and the formerly attempted corridor 
by the PKK/PYD/YPG (Yeşiltaş, Seren & Özçelik, 2017: 31).  
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Operation Olive Branch (OOB) 
Turkey launched the second operation under the name of OOB from January to March 
2018. OOB’s main purpose was to clear the PKK/YPD/YPG in the region of Afrin 
including its surrounding rural areas. OOB was launched in response to the US’ 
increasing support to the PKK/PYD/YPG and plan to form 30 thousand strong border 
security forces called the SDF, within which the Kurdish armed group enjoyed its 
dominant role in northern Syria (TRT World Research Center, 2018: 10). Though the 
state already demanded the US to cease arms transfer and training since they would help 
the expansion of PKK/PYD/YPG’s influence which then harmed its domestic and 
regional stability, the US ignored such demand and rather justified its assistance to 
combat the ISIS’ militias.  
Thanks to the US’ support, the PKK/PYD/YPG evolved to a state-sponsored 
hybrid organization which was able to develop dangerous capacity with relatively 
advanced stand-off weapons such as ATGMS, MANPADS, and rockets, moderately 
trained manpower and larger sized formations of the organization (Kasapoğlu & Ülgen, 
2018: 6). On a par with the US’ support, between January and February 2018 the armed 
group launched up to 94 rockets targeting Turkish population near two border provinces; 
Hatay and Kilis causing socio-economic destruction (Kasapoğlu & Ülgen, 2018: 7-8).  
The PKK/PYD/YPG rising power in the region of Afrin and surroundings as well 
as its increased attacks to Turkey were determinants to the Turkish leaders to take an 
emergency military action against the threats which was more intense than the previous 
incursion engaging both air power and land strikes campaign. OOB used heavy military 
hardware such as F-16 fighter jets, TB2 drones, T122-CNRA rocket launchers, 
ADOP2000-howitzers, and Leopard tanks; however, as the Turkish officials stated the 
incursion would only target the PKK/PYD/YPG’s militias and their shelters, buildings, 
weapons, and equipment (TRT World Research Center, 2018: 25).  
OOB emphasized the takeover of Afrin as it was the most nested region of the 
PKK/PYD/YPG’s militias during the Syrian war which Turkey claimed another terror 
corridor. By circling the town from the south, the state ensured that the armed group could 
not create an adjacent, autonomous region through which it could reach the Mediterranean 
(Ustun, 2018: 2). Before OOB began, Hatay and Kilis had been its fire ring reachable 
from Afrin as well as a doorstep for its militias’ infiltration to Turkey. Had Turkey not 
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launched the operation, the armed group would have turned into a much larger threat with 
the US’ support. According TRT World Research Center (2018: 27), The importance of 
such military move was in line with the Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu’s statement 
at the beginning of OOB: “Turkey is subject to attacks every day from Afrin. It is our 
right to defend ourselves in line with international law and to take measure against a terror 
group surrounding us, violating our rights, hence we should intercede.”  
OOB could be aimed to gain an immediate victory within three months to prevent 
the PKK/PYD/YPG from either making an alliance deal with the Syrian regime or 
bargaining its position with the US. OOB succeeded to neutralize 3,603 militias in total, 
free more than 1,900 square kilometers from the PKK/PYD/YPG and liberate 273 
locations including towns, villages and strategic mountains and hills (TRT World, 2018). 
Following the incursion, Turkey was able to return more than 150,000 Syrian refugees in 
the region (Anadolu Agency, 2018).   
 
Operation Peace Spring (OPS) 
OPS was the third operation launched by Turkey starting on October 9, 2019, only three 
days after the US announced that it would withdraw its troops from the region and move 
to the southeastern region (Cebul, 2019). The US’ lifted its support to the PKK/PYD/YPG 
after long, tough negotiations with the state. So did it reach a deal with Russia on October 
22, 2019, that both states would conduct joint patrols in the areas targeted by the TAF 
during OPS (TRT World, 2019). Those two events facilitated the TAF to clear the armed 
group’s militias in the region and capture two strategic towns; Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn 
which both were initial targets near Turkey’s towns; Akçakale and Ceylanpınar 
respectively.  
Turkey only focused on controlling the two strategic towns by which it could create 
a safe zone stretching between them. The state firmly wished to create a 32-kilometer-
depth safe zone often called a peace corridor clear from the PKK/PYD/YPG that could 
offer shelter for up to 1 to 2 million Syrian refugees. It once halted the incursion to allow 
the Kurdish armed group’s militias to leave the designated safe zone as a part of the deal 
with the US (TRT World, 2019). 
 Despite criticisms from such regional powers as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and including Israel, Turkey confirmed that it would take any action when its 
security was at risk. The state criticized the Middle Eastern states for not doing enough 
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to save the Syrian refugees instead. Beginning with the airstrikes followed by ground 
battles, OPS was deemed as important as the two previous military moves which aimed 
to secure Turkey’s border from the terror groups as the Turkish Foreign Minister 
Cavusoglu (2019) stated: “Turkey’s counter-terrorism operation in northern Syria 
launched to establish a safe zone was very strategic, important and timely not only for 
Turkey but also for Syria and for the stability and security of the region. Turkey spoiled 
a big game with the Operation Peace Spring.” 
 In addition to forcing the PKK/PYD/YPG’s militias and their weapons out of the 
peace corridor, Turkey made a diplomatic success by pushing the US and Russia to 
negotiation tables for its security concern amid the Syrian regime effort to ally with the 
Kurdish armed group and the US domestic actors’ conflicting stands over the incursion 
(Oruc, 2019). OPS could be the most successful move made by Turkey with which it 
could clear the militias in the much larger region than the previous two operations within 
a short time. Furthermore, the state’s move gained people’ support within its operation 
areas as Gallup International (Aktürk, 2019: 2) recorded that OPS was welcomed by the 
majority of Arab population and the surprisingly significant population of Kurdish 
people. 
 
Conclusion 
Analyzed with Buzan’s securitization theory, Turkey’s insecurity caused by both threats 
and vulnerabilities justified its border security policy which was strengthened by the 
anarchic structure of international politics as well as its leaders’ speech capability in 
domestic level. The border security policy was issued because the state was subject to 
regional threats growing in northern Syria especially orchestrated by the ISIS and 
PKK/PYD/YPG. In addition to the threats exposure and geographical proximity with the 
region, it was facing the Kurdish group’s insurgency at home. It had to take a serious 
action to pursue its security interest by removing such threats beyond the border. The 
security dimension was drawn by not only the armed groups but also the consequence of 
their presence like civilian, military personnel and property casualties, border instability, 
and territorial disintegration.  
Such interest had to be championed with its power now that it could hardly rely 
on foreign entities amidst the anarchic structure of international politics. To gain support 
   
TURKEY’S BORDER SECURITY POLICY AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS (2016-2019) 
Luerdi & Amri Hakim 
198 | Departemen Hubungan Internasional FISIP UNPAD   
at the domestic level, the Turkish key leaders securitized the border issue and demanded 
an extraordinary action in the form of military operations. The three military incursions 
called Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, and Operation Peace Spring 
respectively brought about success to the state through which threats coming from the 
non-state actors were removed. By doing so, the state could protect its people, create 
border stability allowing the return of thousands of refugees to northern Syria and 
maintain its national integrity from the secessionist movement. 
That Turkey launched the military incursions or often called counter-terrorism 
operations in northern Syria along with the achievements leading to a regional game-
changing could confirm its growing influence as well as the bargaining position as one of 
the major powers in both Syria’s crisis and region. Despite the situation, the state will not 
ignore the US and Russia factor in pursuing its future interest in which national security 
along with Syria’s integrity remains a priority. To this extent, the Turkish leaders will 
have to find middle ground with those powers like what it has recently done in Syria. 
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